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Abstract
We analyse tax competition when a multinational rm has invested in two countries
but also has an outside option, e.g., towards a third country. An interesting nding is
that more attractive outside options for rms may constitute a win-win situation; the
rm as well as its present host countries may gain when this occurs. The reason that it
benets the host countries is that an enhanced outside option reduces the ine¢ ciencies
of tax competition. An implication of the result is that better outside options for
multinational rms may reduce the gains from host countries policy coordination
and thus reduce those countriesincentives to coordinate their policies. Also, with a
development where outside options become more accessible, the perceived costs of tax
competition, e.g., in terms of underprovision of public goods, may be overestimated.
Our ndings may also have implications for international negotiations, since it provides
an argument for mutual reduction of entry barriers, as this may improve outside
options.
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1 Introduction
Lower barriers to entry and developments in world capital markets have increased the
actual and potential mobility of multinational enterprises (MNEs). This poses challenges
for host countries tax and regulation policies. For a number of countries, such as, for
example, the member countries of the European Union, the policy challenge is two-faceted.
First, they are facing competition from other similar (e.g. EU member) countries, where
national governments try to attract new corporate investments.1 Second, many MNEs
have attractive investment and localisation options in entirely di¤erent countries (outside
the EU-area), e.g., in low cost countries. As global developments make such outside
options more accessible and attractive for MNEs, how will host countries react? What
will be the implications for their tax policies, for the MNEsinvestment decisions and for
host countrieswelfare? In this paper we address these issues. An interesting nding is
that more attractive outside options for MNEs may constitute a win-win situation; the
MNE as well as its present host countries may gain when this occurs. The reason is that
a more attractive outside option for the rm (in the sense of being more attractive for all
types and particularly so for highly e¢ cient types of the rm2), may a¤ect the strategic tax
competition between its present host countries in such a way that a Pareto improvement
is brought about. In such cases the enhanced outside option enforces a reduction in the
investment distortions induced by tax competition between the host countries.
In line with the complex characteristics of most multinational rms,3 we assume that
such a rm has better information than the governments about its e¢ ciency.4 Possessing
private information about e¢ ciency, the MNE has incentives to undertake strategic in-
1 In general, foreign direct investments have been rapidly increasing (see Markusen (1995)), and recent
empirical research show that e¤ective tax rates are important factors for determining the localisation
decisions of multinational enterprises (see, e.g., Devereux and Freeman (1995)).
2See Section 6.2 for the precise denition.
3According to Markusen (1995), multinationals tend to be important in industries and rms that are
characterised by: high levels of R&D relative to sales, a large share of professional and technical workers
in their workforce, products that are new or technically complex, and high levels of product di¤erentiation
and advertising.
4The international nature of an MNE and the high number of interrm transactions make it hard for
authorities to observe its true income and costs. Complex technology also implies obstacles for authorities
to ascertain the rms e¢ ciency, and thereby derive its true operating prots. Many of the inputs are not
standard commodities with established market prices, making it di¢ cult to monitor costs or impose norm
prices.
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vestments. On the one hand, to receive favorable treatment in terms of taxation, the rm
may like to be conceived as a low-productivity type in the EU-countries. But it would also
like to indicate that it is highly mobile, i.e., unless operating conditions in the EU-area
are su¢ ciently favorable, it may reschedule investments or migrate altogether to another
region where net costs are lower. To signal a credible threat of relocation, the rm would
like to be conceived as having a high reservation prot, i.e., a high productivity on alterna-
tive investments. However, under the reasonable assumption that the rms productivities
inside and outside the EU-area are positively correlated, the rm cannot at the same time
indicate a low and a high productivity. So the rm has countervailing incentives vis-a-vis
each government, but may still pitch governments against each other.
We model this setting as a common agency; the rm relates to several principals
(governments) but has in addition an outside option. Previous papers on tax competition
have also considered an outside option for the rm, but have assumed the option to be the
same for all types, and hence typically normalized to zero. What is di¤erent here is that it
is larger than zero and type dependent. The paper thus analyses the combined e¤ects of
countervailing incentives (see Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare
(1995), Jullien (2000)) and common agency (Martimort (1992), Stole (1992), Martimort
and Stole (2002, 2009)). Multiprincipal problems with countervailing incentives have
previously been studied by Mezzetti (1997), but in a di¤erent and complementary setting.5
There is by now a considerable literature analysing tax and regulatory competition in
various settings, see Gresik (2001) for a general survey and Bond and Gresik (1996), Olsen
and Osmundsen (2001, 2003), La¤ont and Pouyet (2004) and Calzolari (2001, 2004) for
analyses in common agency frameworks. The novel feature considered here is the strategic
implications of better outside options for rms, and in particular of outside options that
are relatively more attractive for very e¢ cient rms.
In several parts of the world countries work to coordinate and harmonize their tax
policies. The EU is a prominent example. We analyse the e¤ects of such measures by
comparing outcomes for cooperating and competing countries, respectively. We show that
5 In Mezzetti (1997) the agent has private information about his relative productivity in the tasks he
performs for two principals. With this informational assumption Mezzetti obtains a case of countervailing
incentives and contract complements. In our model the agent has private information about his absolute
e¢ ciency level, the relevant actions are contract substitutes, and the presence of countervailing incentives
is due to an outside option. The two models yield di¤erent implications; e.g. whereas Mezzetti obtains
equilibria with pooling for a range of intermediate types, we obtain fully separating equilibria.
3
with the presence of an outside option, tax competition - relative to coordination - may
entail lower investments for ine¢ cient rms and higher investments for e¢ cient ones, and
that the rms prots may be lower or higher when the countries compete than when they
cooperate. Whether the rm is better or worse o¤ under policy competition relative to
policy coordination, depends among other things on investment substitution possibilities
and its ownership structure. The rm is better o¤ under a cooperative relative to a
competitive regime when the elasticity of substitution is low, or if owner shares held by
residents of the cooperating countries are large. And as already mentioned, we also show
that a higher outside option for the rm may actually be benecial for the rms host
countries when they are engaged in tax competition with each other. This means that
better outside options for the rm may reduce the gains from policy coordination and thus
reduce host countriesincentives to coordinate their policies.
In common agency models (e.g. Bond and Gresik, 1996)6 it has been shown that tax
competition (rather than cooperation) may make both governments and rms worse o¤.
In other tax competition models a similar result may emerge, typically in cases where tax
competition leads to overtaxation (Huizinga and Nielsen, 1997).7 Given this, the main
contribution of this paper is to show that an improvement of the outside option may reduce
the ine¢ ciencies of tax competition.
The intuition for our nding that the two competing countries can be better o¤ if the
type-dependent outside option increases (in the sense that it is larger for any type and
relatively more so for the most e¢ cient types), is that although a better outside option
makes the participation constraint more di¢ cult to be met for national authorities, the
larger outside option becomes a more stringent disciplining device for the authorities, and
hence limits the negative externalities they mutually exert. When the countries coordinate
instead, the countrieswelfare is reduced by a larger outside option as expected.
Our nding implies that, with a development where outside options become more
accessible, the perceived costs of tax competition, e.g., in terms of underprovision of public
goods, may be overestimated. Another implication is that our ndings may o¤er another
argument against protectionism, as the mutual opening up of the economy is likely to
6Models where two governments choose trade taxes to regulate a multinational rm with private cost
information.
7A two-period model under symmetric information where a country may levy source- and residence-
based capital income taxes and where part of the rm may be owned by foreigners.
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enhance the rmsoutside options.
2 The model
The MNE invests K1 in country 1 and K2 in country 2,8 yielding prots (before joint
costs and taxes) N1(K1; ) and N2(K2; ), where  is an e¢ ciency parameter. The MNE
also has an option of investing in another economic area. To simplify we assume that
if the MNE exercises this option, it moves all its operations to this region.9 We further
assume that it is not optimal for the MNE to make all its investments only in country 1
or only in country 2.10 There are several examples that may motivate this assumption.
First, consider a vertically integrated MNE which is located in two EU-countries (e.g., coal
mining and natural gas extraction). Extraction levels exceed local demand, and excess
output is exported to the neighbouring country, due to high transportation costs. Such a
rm cannot credibly threaten to concentrate all its activities in only one of the countries.
The outside option of the rm may be to extract natural resources and serve customers in
another region. The second case is an MNE (e.g., in the food industry), that is presently
located in two EU-countries.11 The MNE is likely to maintain some activity in both
countries due to irreversible investments that have been made in production facilities.
Even without the presence of xed factors, the rm may want to be present in both of the
countries in order to be close to the customers and thus closely observe changing consumer
patterns.12 A third explanation for localisation in several countries is that the MNE is a
multi-product rm, e.g., a producer of household appliances or semi-conductors, and that
the countries di¤er with respect to the presence of industrial clusters for di¤erent types
8 In addition there may be sunk investments in both countries.
9Given a passive government in the outside region, this assumption mainly serves to simplify notation.
An alternative setup would be to assume that the MNE in equilibrium actually invests in a third country,
in which case the outside option would be to reschedule a larger fraction of its activities to this country.
This alternative approach would generate the same qualitative results..
10We thus assume intrinsic common agency. Calzolari and Scarpa (2008) and Martimort and Stole
(2009) analyse both intrinsic and delegated agency, but assume a type-independent outside option. As a
rst step for the type dependent case, we limit the analysis to intrinsic common agency.
11The division of investments may have historical explanations, e.g., that the output is sold to consumers
in both countries and that there used to be large transportation costs or other trade barriers.
12This is important for products characterised by local variations in taste, and where product develop-
ment, design and fashion are important. The food and furniture industries are examples.
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of products.13 Lower trade costs may open up the possibility to locate in low cost or low
tax regions, i.e., outside options may emerge.
Let  and  denote, respectively, the pre- and post-tax global prots of the rm:
(K1;K2; ) = N1(K1; ) +N2(K2; )  C(K); (1)
 =   r1   r2; (2)
where K = K1 +K2, C(K) denotes joint costs for the two a¢ liates and r1 and r2 are the
taxes paid to the two countries.14 We assume that C 0(K) > 0; C 00(K) > 0: The convex
costs C(K) imply economic interaction e¤ects among the two a¢ liates; an increase in the
investments in one of the countries implies a higher marginal joint cost, which again a¤ects
the investments of the other country. These joint costs may have di¤erent interpretations.
First, K may represent scarce human capital, e.g., management resources or technical
personnel, where we assume that the MNE faces convex recruitment and training costs.
Second, K may represent real investments, where C(K) are management and monitoring
costs of the MNE. Economic management and co-ordination often become more demanding
as the scale of international operations increase, i.e., C(K) is likely to be convex. Third,
instead of interpreting C(K) as joint costs, it may in the case of imperfect competition be
perceived as measuring interaction e¤ects in terms of market power. For example, if the
two a¢ liates sell their output on the same market (e.g., in a third country), their activities
are substitutes: high investments (and output) in a¢ liate 1 reduce the price obtained by
a¢ liate 2. Another example of a market interaction e¤ect is a case where K1 and K2
are investments in R&D; the marginal payo¤ on R&D-activities of a¢ liate 1 is lower the
higher is the R&D activity of a¢ liate 2, e.g., due to a patent race.15
The countries compete to attract scarce real investments from the MNE, and the inter-
action of the principals is through the MNEs joint costs. Note that @
2
@K1@K2
=  C 00(K) <
0; e.g., we address a case of contracting substitutes. The a¢ liates of the MNE are separate
and independent entities, which means that they are subsidiaries and thus taxed at source.
13An example of a rm with such a dispersed manufacturing structure is Phillips. The value of the MNE
may be closely linked to its business strategy of supplying multiple products. If this is common knowledge,
a threat to become a niche producer that is located in only one country would not be credible.
14Nothing substantial would change by using a more general (convex) cost function C(K1;K2); with
@2C=@K1@K2 > 0:
15Olsen (1993) analyses single-principal regulation of independent R&D units, and emphasizes the role
of research activities as substitutes.
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The rm has private information about  and net operating prots in the two countries. It
is presumed that if the rm is e¢ cient in one country it is also an e¢ cient operator in the
other country; for reasons of tractability we assume that the rm has the same e¢ ciency
in the two countries. E¢ ciency types are distributed according to the cumulative distrib-
ution function F ( _) with density f() having the support

; 

, where  denotes the least
and  the most e¢ cient type. E¢ cient types have higher net operating prots than less
e¢ cient types, both on average and at the margin: @Nj@ (Kj ; ) > 0 and
@2Nj
@@Kj
(Kj ; ) > 0,
j = 1; 2; where the latter inequality is a single crossing condition.
The MNE and the governments are risk neutral. For all e¢ ciency types the a¢ liates
net operating prots in each country are su¢ ciently high so that both governments always
want to induce the domestic a¢ liate to make some investments in their home country.
Domestic consumer surpluses in the two countries are una¤ected by changes in the MNEs
production level, since the rm is assumed to be a price taker (or its market is outside the
two countries). The governments have utilitarian objective functions: the social domestic
welfare generated by the MNE is a weighted sum of the domestic taxes paid by the rm
and the rms global prots:
Wj = (1 + j)rj + j; j = 1; 2;
where j is the general equilibrium shadow cost of public funds in country j, and j is
the owner share of country j in the MNE. The shadow costs of public funds are taken as
exogenously given in our partial analysis. We have j > 0; j = 1; 2, since marginal public
expenditure is nanced by distortive taxes. By inserting for Eq.(1), the social welfare
function for country 1 can be restated as
W1 = (1 + 1) ((K1;K2; )  r2)  (1 + 1   1): (3)
The MNE has an additional localisation alternative: it has an option to move all its
activity outside the EU area, e.g., to a low cost country or to a tax haven. This investment
option would produce an after tax prot of n(), i.e., the rm has private information about
the alternative return on its scarce resources. Assuming that rms that have high returns
in the EU area also have high returns on outside options, we have n0() > 0. We consider
here the case where the participation constraint is binding for some type(s) other than
the least productive one, i.e., for some type  6= . In these cases there are typically
countervailing incentives, where low-productivity types are tempted to claim to have high
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productivity in order to secure themselves high rents. To illustrate these e¤ects, and yet
have a fairly simple model, we conne ourselves to cases where the participation constraint
is binding only for the least productive and the most productive type, i.e., only for  = 
and  = . This will occur, for example, if the outside returns function n() is su¢ ciently
convex, in a sense to be made precise below.
3 A simple case
To illustrate the forces at play in a simple setting, we consider rst a case with independent
investments ( @
2
@K1@K2
= 0), two symmetric countries and the rm being entirely owned by
residents in those countries (so 1 + 2 = 1). To have a particularly simple cooperative
benchmark, we will also at rst assume zero shadow costs of public funds (j = 0).16
This assumption implies that if the countries cooperate there is no motive to introduce
distortive taxation, since the cooperative welfare in this case is W1 +W2 = (K1;K2; ).
Any rents (pure prots) obtained by the rm accrue in the end to domestic residents in
the two countries, and since such rents are not costly by assumption, taxation should be
non-distortive. Investments will then be rst-best, maximizing the rms global prots
(K1;K2; ). This outcome will prevail independently of the rms options outside the
two countries.
Operating non-cooperatively, however, each country has a motive to extract rents from
the rm. This follows because rents accruing to foreign residents reduce domestic welfare;
see (3). This "equity externality" leads to distortive taxation in each country in the non-
cooperative setting, and hence to reduced welfare compared with the cooperative case.
The distortions follow from each countrys usual trade-o¤ between rent extraction and
production e¢ ciency under asymmetric information.17 But now the form and extent of
these distortions will depend on the rms options outside the two countries. To induce
the rm to stay in the region, its rents cannot be reduced too much. And in particular,
if the most e¢ cient types of MNEs have very attractive outside options compared to less
e¢ cient types, the most e¢ cient types cannot be taxed too harshly. It turns out that
this limitation on the countriesability to tax the most e¢ cient types leads, under some
16While unrealistic, the assumption simplies intuitive explanations for the results, and is made here for
that reason only.
17Given independent investments, the rm will adjust its investments independently in the two countries,
and hence each countrys trade o¤ is essentially that of a single principal in this case.
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conditions, to reduced overall distortions in the non-cooperative taxation regime. Hence
we can conclude in those cases that better outside options (for the most e¢ cient types
of MNEs) will lead to improved welfare, and hence constitute a win-win situation for the
parties involved. By crowding back distortionary taxation, the enhanced outside option
is benecial for both the government and the rms owners. It dampens tax competition
and by that reduces the extent of underinvestment and improves welfare.
It is important to note that the type dependency of the outside option is crucial in this
argument. If all e¢ ciency types of rms faced the same outside option, then a change of
this option would not a¤ect the tax induced investment distortions in the two countries.
Each country would in such a case optimally react by adjusting the lump-sum element of
its tax scheme so that all typesrents were adjusted to the new outside level. The trade-
o¤s between rent extraction and production e¢ ciency would not be a¤ected, and hence
the distortive elements of the tax schemes would also remain una¤ected. Investments and
hence welfare would thus not be a¤ected by a change of such a type independent outside
option.
With type dependency, however, there are countervailing incentives that a¤ect the
trade o¤ between rent extraction and production e¢ ciency for each country, and these
incentives are crucially inuenced by how the outside option varies with types. It is
through this link that variations in the outside options for the most e¢ cient relative to
the least e¢ cient types will have repercussions for the tax induced distortions in the two
countries, and hence for the two countrieswelfare.
To see this in some detail, let Rj(Kj) denote the taxes that the rm pays to government
j, based on the rms investments in country j. (The following analysis is heuristic, since a
stringent analysis for the more general case is given in later sections.) For multinationals,
prots are not observable to the tax authorities, due to among other things strategic
transfer pricing. Taxes are therefore made contingent on investments, which are assumed
here to be the key veriable variables for such a rm.18 The assumption @
2
@K1@K2
= 0
implies that the rms investments in the two countries are now independent and given
by @@Kj = R
0
j(Kj). Moreover, the rms equilibrium prots (rents) satisfy (by e.g. the
18Prots may be less di¢ cult to verify for purely domestic rms, and di¤erent tax schemes may thus be
introduced for purely domestic and for multinational rms, reecting the poorer information available for
the latter.
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envelope property)
0() =
@
@
(K1();K2(); ) (4)
Acting non-cooperatively, each country chooses its tax scheme to maximize domestic ex-
pected welfare EWj , subject to incentive compatibility (IC), represented by (4), and par-
ticipation (IR) constraints (()  n(), all ), taking the tax scheme of the other country
as given. A comprehensive analysis of this problem has been given by Jullien (2000) for
the single-principal case. Since investments in the two countries are here independent, his
results apply for each of the two principals. (See later sections for the more general case.)
Moreover, throughout the paper we conne ourselves to the case of outside option
functions n() that leave the IR constraints non-binding for interior types. There will
then be at most one type (say j) where the IC constraint is non-binding in the sense
that the countervailing incentives exactly balance; i.e. the temptation to claim low  to
indicate low productivity is for this type just balanced by the temptation to claim high
 to indicate favorable outside options. From Juliens analysis it now follows that the
best-response tax scheme for each country is characterized by investments that satisfy
@
@Kj
  (1  j) @
2
@Kj@
F (j)  F ()
f()
= 0: (5)
To interpret this equation, note that a tax induced higher investment dKj by type  will
a¤ect country js welfareWj = (Kj ;Ki; ) Ri(Ki) (1 j) partly by its e¤ect on the
rms pre-tax prots  and partly by its e¤ect on rents . The two terms in (5) capture
these e¤ects. (By the independence assumption invoked here, foreign investments and tax
payments will not be a¤ected.) For e¢ ciency types  below type j incentive constraints
are binding downwards: the incentive to claim low productivity dominates the incentive
to claim high outside options. A higher investment by such a type of rm will tighten
incentive constraints for more e¢ cient types (types in the range (; j)), and this is costly
in terms of increased rents to such rms. The second term in (5) accounts for these welfare
costs.19
When type j coincides with the most e¢ cient one (j = ) - the conventional case
- there is a welfare cost for all types except . Equilibrium investments are then lower
than their rst-best levels. If on the other hand j < , the second term in (5) is negative
for  > j , so the welfare e¤ect associated with the rms rents is positive. For such
19From (4) the rent di¤erential 0()d increases by @
2
@Kj@
d, and the same increase must be given to
all types in (; j), hence to a fraction F (j)  F () of all types.
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types the incentive constraints are binding upwards; the rm is tempted to mimic a more
e¢ cient type in order to make it appear that it has a higher outside option. By inducing
such a rm to invest more, and thereby increase its internalprots, (), the incentive
constraints for rms with lower e¢ ciency (types in the range (j ; )) are relaxed. This
leads to overinvestments relative to the rst-best solution for these types.
We have j < , and hence overinvestments for high-e¢ ciency types  > j , when the
participation constraint for the most e¢ cient type is binding (() = n()). Variations
in the outside prot for the most e¢ cent type (keeping the outside prot for the least
e¢ cient type xed) will thus a¤ect j and hence a¤ect investment distortions, see (5).20 It
is through this link that variations in this outside prot have repercussions for equilibrium
investments and welfare.
Suppose now that the participation constraint for the most e¢ cient type is just bind-
ingin the sense that j =  initially, but any higher outside prot for this type (n() > 0)
yields countervailing incentives and j < . Then there are underinvestments for all types
initially (when j =  and so @@Kj > 0 for all  <
), but higher investments for the most
e¢ cient types after a change involving higher outside prots for type  (and by continuity
of n() for types nearby ). After the change we have countervailing incentives with a
new 
0
j <
, and hence certainly higher investments for all types  > 
0
j , but also higher
investments than initially for a range of intermediate types (for  in some interval (0; 0j)).
On the margin, these investment increases are benecial for welfare, since investments
were too low initially.
In later sections, we identify conditions under which these types of adjustments, in-
duced by the countriesnon-cooperative tax responses to better outside options for the
most e¢ cient types of rms, lead to improvements in each countrys expected welfare.
We then allow for substitution possibilities in production ( @
2
@K1@K2
< 0), non-EU foreign
ownership (1 + 2 < 1) and non-zero costs of public funds (j > 0). The analytical
advantage of assuming zero marginal costs of public funds is of course that the basis for
welfare comparisons becomes very simple, namely the rst-best allocation, independent
of outside options. However, in such a case the only reason to tax corporations is to
extract rents from residents in the other country. In reality, the marginal cost of public
20More precisesly, it is variations in the outside prot di¤erence n()   n() for the most and least
e¢ cient types that a¤ect j and hence a¤ect investments, see Section 6. We consider variations that allows
n()  n() to increase for all  > .
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funds is positive, and the government has additional motives for rent extraction. Welfare
comparisons are then more challenging, as the basis for comparisons (cooperative welfare
in the two countries) also changes when the level of the outside option changes. The level
of underinvestment may be reduced to some extent (generating higher welfare), but at the
same time the rm gets to keep more of the rent (which reduces welfare).
Thus, other things equal, the higher is the cost of leaving rents to the rm, the less
likely it is that an enhanced outside option is welfare improving. Available estimates of the
marginal cost of public funds are, however, fairly small; see Snow and Warren (1996).21
But also, in our setting other things are not equal, since the tax equilibrium depends on
the magnitude of the marginal cost of public funds. In our model we nd for the case of
no substitution possibilities that enhanced outside options for the rm are always welfare
improving (over some range), but that the positive welfare e¤ect is lower, the higher is the
marginal cost of public funds (see Proposition 6).
Another complexity of welfare comparisons arises when we allow for substitution pos-
sibilities in production ( @
2
@K1@K2
< 0). The substitution possibilities imply that tax com-
petition will involve strategic elements where one countrys adjustment of domestic taxes
induce investment responses in the other country. Each country will then try to expand
its tax base at the expense of the other, i.e., we have a case of scal externalities. It turns
out that these strategic elements dampen the positive welfare e¤ects identied above. The
underlying reason for this is that the equity externality e¤ectdiscussed in this section
and the strategic e¤ects induced by substitution possibilities tend to have opposite e¤ects
on equilibrium investments.22
We nd (for a class of parametric specications) that better outside options for the
most e¢ cient types of the rm leads to improved welfare when the shadow costs of public
funds are relatively small, the substitution possibilities are limited, and ownership by
residents of the two countries (1+2) is relatively large. More precisely this holds when,
for 1 = 2 we have 1+21+ > 	, where 	 < 1 is a number positively related to the
21The opportunity cost of an additional dollar of tax revenue includes the marginal welfare cost caused
by the increase in distortionary taxation. Estimates of marginal welfare cost of public funds have varied
widely. An overview and analysis of estimates is given by Snow and Warren (1996). From their Table 1
we can infer that 0.2 is a reasonable estimate.
22See Section 5 below. Olsen and Osmundsen (2001) analysed these e¤ects for the type-independent
outside option case.
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elasticity of substitution in production (see Proposition 6).23 For a numerical illustration,
it may be noted that for 1 = 2 = 0:2 and 1 = 2 = 0:5 the condition holds if the
elasticity of substitution () is less than 3.5; see the discussion following Proposition 5.
If  is su¢ ciently high, an enhanced outside option will reduce welfare, as the induced
e¤ect on equilibrium investments is either negative for welfare, or if positive dominated
by the negative welfare e¤ect of increased rents to the rm. For  = 0 it is only the
equity externalities that generate a deviation between cooperative and non-cooperative
equilibrium, and an enhanced outside option will then (in some range) always move the
equilibrium towards higher welfare by reducing the negative impacts of the equity exter-
nalities. For a given outside option, substitution ( > 0) will cause strategic e¤ects (scal
externalities) that counteract the equity externalities. In fact, for a certain level of  (the
level corresponding to 1+21+ = 	()) the two types of externalities will neutralize each
other, so that cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria will be equal. An enhanced out-
side option will then not generate any positive welfare e¤ects. For  higher than this level,
enhanced outside options will always reduce welfare. But as we have seen, for reasonable
paramater values this critical level of  tends to be quite high.
4 Cooperating countries
To have a benchmark, consider the case where the two countries cooperatively design their
tax policies. The countries (principals) then seek to maximise the cooperative welfare
given by W = W1 + W2 (we assume 1 = 2) subject to incentive compatibility (IC)
and participation (IR) constraints for the rm. Incentive compatibility requires that the
rms equilibrium prots (rents) satisfy (4).24 This rst-order condition (4) together
with K 0j() > 0; j = 1; 2 are su¢ cient for incentive compatibility.25. Since the principals
cooperate and act a single one, we have from Julien (2000) the following result.
23 It turns out that this is exactly the condition that leads to the kind of equilibrium investment responses
considered in this section, where non-cooperative investments exceed cooperative investments for the most
e¢ cient types.
24To interpret this condition here, note that if type  + d mimics the less e¢ cient type  (by investing
Kj() instead of Kj( + d)), it obtains additional prots (K();  + d) (K(); ) relative to type 
in country j. To avoid such behavior the principal must allow for this rent di¤erential in the tax scheme.
25Monotonicity of Kj() is typically ensured by assuming that F () has a monotone hazard rate.
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Proposition 1 Suppose there is a  2 [; ] such that K1();K2() given by
(K1();K2()) = arg max
K1;K2

(K1;K2; )  (1  1 + 2
1 + 
)
@
@
(K1;K2; )
F ()  F ()
f()

are increasing (K 0j()  0). Suppose further that the associated rent () given by (4),
i.e., (0) =
R 0

@
@ (K1();K2(); ) d + (); satises ()  n() and
(a) () = n() if  = .
(b) () = n() and () = n() if  <  < .
(c) () = n() if  = .
Then (K1();K2()) together with the associated rent () is the optimal solution.
Note that the rst order conditions for optimal investments take the form (double
subscripts denote second-order partials)
(1 + )
@
@Kj
  (1 +   1   2)j F (
)  F ()
f()
= 0: (6)
This is similar to condition (5) above, and similar interpretations apply. The cases (a)-
(c) represent cases where the participation constraints are binding (a) only for the least
e¢ cient type, (b) for the least and for the most e¤eicient types, and (c) only for the most
e¤cient type.
5 Non-cooperative equilibrium
Consider now the case where the governments of the two countries compete (to attract
the rms investments) rather than cooperate. In this case the MNE relates to each
government separately. The governments cannot credibly share information and they
act non-cooperatively. In the present context it is natural to consider equilibria in tax
functions.26 Let, as in Section 3, Rj(Kj) denote the taxes that the rm pays to government
j, based on the rms investments in country j. We say that a pair K1();K2() of
investment proles is commonly implementable if there are tax schedules Rj(Kj), one for
each principal, such that for every type  the rms prots are maximal for this pair of
investments.
Lemma 2 In any di¤erentiable equilibrium where IR-constraints are binding only for
types ;  we have: There exists 1; 2 2 [; ] such that equilibrium investments and prots
26Under mild conditions this is not restrictive, see Martimort and Stole (2002).
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satisfy
iK
0
i   12K 01K 02; i = 1; 2 and K 01K 02
 
12 +12

1K
0
1 +2K
0
2
  0 (7)
@
@Kj
=
1 +   j
1 + 
"
j +i
ijK
0
i()
i +ijK
0
j()
#
F (j)  F ()
f()
: (8)
and Z 

@
@
(Kj(
0);Ki(0); 0)d0 + ()  n(), all , with equality for  = ; : (9)
Condition (7) is a well known necessary condition for common implementability, de-
rived from the second-order conditions for the rms maximization problem (see e.g. Stole
(1992)). Except for the parameters (1; 2), the conditions (8) are analogous to the equi-
librium conditions derived by Stole (1992) and others for the conventional case where the
outside value is type independent. The conventional case corresponds to 1 = 2 = .
To understand condition (8) note that the terms on the LHS represent the marginal
e¤ect of increased Kj on country js surplus (adjusted by factor 1 + ). The term on the
RHS represents the marginal e¤ects on rents (also adjusted by factor 1+). This term has
itself two components; the rst is the conventional (direct) one, just like in the cooperative
case; the second is a strategic e¤ect, working through the change in foreign investments
(say @K^i@Kj ) induced by the change in domestic investments. The foreign investment K^i is
given by @@Ki (Kj ; K^i; ) = R
0
i and hence satises (R
00
i  ii) @K^i@Kj = ij . In equilibrium the
rst-order condition for K^i holds as an identity in , and by di¤erentiating this identity we
obtain @K^i@Kj =
ijK
0
i()
i+ijK
0
j()
. This explains the formula (8). If investments are substitutes,
increasing in both countries, and commonly implementable, the strategic e¤ect will be
negative.
Apart from the strategic e¤ect, conditions (8) and (6) also di¤er in the way that
condition (8) involves country-specic parameters j and only domestic owner shares (j).
The latter reects an equity externality; country j doesnt internalize the implications of
its policy for the rms foreign owners. This makes country j more aggressive with respect
to extracting rents. The equity and strategic e¤ects tend to have opposite e¤ects on
equilibrium investments.
To derive su¢ cient conditions for an equilibrium we conne ourselves to quadratic
versions (approximations) for the relevant functions and a uniform distribution over types.
Then we have:
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Proposition 3 Suppose countries are symmetric,  is uniform and () has constant
second-order partials with 12 < 0 (substitutes) and that (K1;K2; ) is concave in
K1;K2. Then investments K1();K2() is a di¤erentiable equilibrium with IR-constraints
binding only for types ;  if and only if (7), (8) and (9) hold for some j ; i 2 [; ].
6 Properties of equilibria
In this section we will analyse properties of equilibria for the model. The following para-
metrization will be used
Nj(Kj ; ) = m(Kj + h) + kKj   12qK2j
C(K1;K2) =
1
2a(K1 +K2)
2;
F () =  for  2 [0; 1],
with m; k; q; a > 0. The assumption q > 0 guarantees concavity of . With this parame-
trization the second-order partials are
12 =  a, jj =  (q + a), j = m.
As a reference point, the full information rst-best solution is in this case given by
@
@Ki
= 0. This yields symmetric investment schedules that are linear in . The rst-order
conditions (6) for the cooperative case also yield linear and symmetric solutions, and these
exhibit underinvestment for low types (possibly overinvestment for high types) compared
to rst-best investments.
6.1 Equilibrium investments and prots
In the non-cooperative setting; the equilibrium equations (8) have linear solutions, say of
the form Kj() = Lj + K 0j; j = 1; 2, see the appendix. The slopes of the equilibrium
schedules are seen to be independent of 1; 2, and therefore the same as in the case of
a type-independent outside option. For symmetric countries (where 1 = 2) they are
also symmetric, so K 01 = K 02 = K 0. While the slopes K 0j of the equilibrium schedules
are uniquely determined (and equal), the intercepts Lj (or equivalently the parameters
1; 2) are not unique and not necessarily equal, even when countries are symmetric.27
But the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is the symmetric one, and we will concentrate on
27 In the (intrinsic) common agency framework we consider here, the equilibrium doesnt pin down the
way that the countries divide between themselves the burden of providing rents for the rm, and this
implies that equilibrium investments are not uniquely pinned down either.
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that equilibrium in the following.
Proposition 4 (i)The slopes K 0j of the equilibrium investment schedules given in Propo-
sition 3 are unique (and equal if the countries are symmetrical), but the intercepts of these
linear schedules are generally not unique. (ii) Equilibrium prots () are uniquely deter-
mined. (iii) For symmetric countries the equilibrium with the highest total expected welfare
is the symmetric one.
We now turn to a comparison of resource allocations under the cooperative and the
non-cooperative regimes. In the following we assume that the Pareto-preferred symmetric
equilibrium is chosen under non-cooperation. We also assume that the outside value n()
for the rm is such that participation constraints are binding only for the least e¤cient
and/or most e¢ cient types.
Proposition 5 There is a critical number 	 < 1, (	 = 1=(1 + q4a),
q
a =
11
12
  1), such
that for 1+21+ > 	 we have: The rms prots are for all types  2 (; ) lower when the
countries compete than when they cooperate. Hence, the IR constraint for the most e¢ cient
type  is either (i) binding in both regimes, (ii) binding only in the competitive regime,
or (iii) non-binding for both regimes. Investments are in case (iii) lower for all types
(but type ) under competition compared to cooperation. In cases (i) and (ii), investments
under competition are lower for ine¢ cient types (all  < ~, some ~ < ) and higher for
e¢ cient types ( > ~) compared to investments under cooperation.
For 1+21+ < 	 the converse conclusions hold.
The proposition implies that the rms prots are lower in the competitive regime when
the insideowner share 1 + 2 is large. This result parallels that given in Olsen and
Osmundsen (2001) for the case of a constant (type-independent) outside option. When
inside owner shares are large the equity externalities are large, and this leads to more
aggressive rent extraction when countries compete compared to when they cooperate.
The type-dependent outside option yields however quite di¤erent implications for equi-
librium investments. For a constant outside option, the more aggressive rent extraction
associated with large equity externalities leads to equilibrium investments (under compe-
tition) that are for all types lower than investments under cooperation. This is covered by
case (iii) in the proposition. But when outside options are type-dependent, and the most
e¢ cient types have su¢ ciently better outside options than less e¤cient types (cases (i) and
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(ii)), equilibrium investments are for the more e¤cient types higher than investments under
cooperation. The more aggressive rent extraction associated with large equity externalities
leads in this case to larger investments for high types and lower investments for low types.
The conditions in the proposition can be related to the ease with which capital can
be substituted between the two countries. The elasticity of substitution between K1
and K2 for the rms symmetric pre-tax prot function (K1;K2; ), evaluated at the
point K1 = K2 = 12KF (), where KF () is the rst-best investment in each country, is
 = 2aq + 1.
28 In view of this, the last proposition says that the rms rents tend to be
lower under competition compared to cooperation when the elasticity of substitution is
small.29 Thus, it is when substitution is not too easy (aq small) that the rm tends to be
worse o¤ when the countries compete compared to when they cooperate.
6.2 Implications of better outside options
We now consider comparative statics e¤ects of variations in the outside value for the
rm. This analysis is complicated by the fact that the equilibrium in principle depends on
the whole prole of outside values (over all types), and hence that the exercise in general
should involve comparisons of all such proles. We limit ourselves to proles that generate
the type of equilibrium studied above, i.e. where the participation constraints are binding
only for the most e¢ cient and least e¢ cient types. We will show that if n1() and n2()
are two such proles, and n1()  n2(), then under competition it may well be the case
that the higher prole n1() yields a greater social surplus than the lower prole n2().
Hence all parties may gain when the rms outside option becomes more favorable. This
will not occur when the countries cooperate, since the higher prole implies a stricter set
of participation constraints and therefore if anything a lower total surplus.
All else equal (technology, demand, owner shares etc.) an equilibrium of the form
studied in this paper is determined by the outside option values for the most e¢ cient and
the least e¢ cient types of the rm, or more precisely by the di¤erence n()  n(). This
single number, which we will denote by , determines how the equilibrium depends on the
outside value prole. Normalizing n() = 0, we have  = n(). Such an equilibrium is
only feasible for  in some range (1; 2). The lower bound 1 of this range is the rent that
28For the quadratic (and symmetric) functional form we nd, for symmetric investments;  =
q+2a
q
(KF ()
Kj
  1), where KF () = m+kq+2a .
29For 1 = 2 = :5 the condition is  < q4a , i.e.  < 1 +
1
2
, hence  < 3:5 for  = :2.
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would accrue to the best type in the conventional case with type-independent reservation
prot. This corresponds to the case 1 = 2 =  in our model. The upper bound 2 is the
prot that would accrue to the best type if on the other hand 1 = 2 = .
For  in this range, the rms equilibrium prot is unique and given by a convex
function (; ). Here  is used as an indexing parameter; we have (; ) = . Note
that any outside value prole that satises n() = (; ) = 0, n() = (; ) = , and
n()  (; ), will generate such an equilibrium. Let N() denote the family of all such
proles. Formally
Denition. For  in (1; 2), let N() be the family of all outside value proles
that satisfy n() = 0, n() =  and n()  (; ), where (; ) is (uniquely) given by
(; ) =
R 

@
@
 
K1(
0);K2(0); 0

d0, (; ) = , and Kj(); j = 1; 2 satisfy (8) and
(9) with j 2 (; ), j = 1; 2.
We will study how the equilibrium outcome associated with an outside value prole in
the family N() varies when  varies on the interval (1; 2). Each prole in N() yields
equilibrium prots (; ), and this function is increasing in . A more favorable outside
option, in the sense of one that yields an outside value that is higher for the best type and
that belongs to the corresponding family N(), will thus lead to equilibrium prots that
are more favorable for every type of rm.
Proposition 6 For 1+21+ > 	 (respectively
1+2
1+ < 	), where 	 = 1=(1 +
q
4a) < 1,
we have: For the family N() it is the case that, as  (the outside value for the best
type) increases on (1; 2), the total welfare E(W1 +W2) associated with the symmetric
non-cooperative equilibrium rst increases and then decreases (respectively decreases over
the whole interval). In any case, every type of rm benets as  increases. The marginal
welfare e¤ect ( @@E(W1 +W2)=1) is smaller, the larger is the cost of public funds and
the larger is the elasticity of substitution.
The proposition shows that the total surplus under competition is either (i) rst in-
creasing and then decreasing, or (ii) monotone decreasing in the rms outside value index
. More favorable outside opportunities for the rm will thus in a set of cases improve the
social surplus, although only up to some point. But the improvement may be considerable;
the e¢ ciency loss relative to the rst-best outcome may be reduced by as much as 75%
when the outside value increases this way.30
30This reduction is obtained for 1 + 2 = 1 and  = 0; proof available from the authors.
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Note also that the condition that denes case (i) (1+21+ > 	), is the same condition
that makes the competitive tax regime less attractive for the rm than the cooperative
regime. This is thus the case where domestic owner shares are relatively large, the cost
of public funds is relatively small, and substitution of investments is not too easy for the
rm. Since the surplus under cooperation will if anything decline as  increases, we see
that the relative performance of the competitive regime will then improve as the rms
outside opportunities become better. The total benets of cooperation will thus become
smaller when the most e¤cient types of MNEs get more attractive outside opportunities
(e.g. in third-country tax havens), and the incentives to cooperate will diminish in such
cases.
We have in Section 3 provided some intuition for the result. When domestic owner
shares are large and substitution of investments is not too easy for the rm (1+21+ > 	),
the equilibrium responses to better outside options for the most e¢ cient types of rms
entail investments that for those rms become higher relative to investments under coop-
eration. This is benecial when there are underinvestments compared to the cooperative
levels initially.
7 Conclusion
We analyse a case where an MNE allocates investments between two countries (the home
region), while also having an outside investment option, e.g. a low cost region or a tax
haven. The two countries in the home region compete to attract the rms investments
and to extract rents from the rm. The ability to tax and regulate the MNE is limited
by private information, e.g. facilitated by a large number of transfer prices for services
provided among various a¢ liates of the MNE. The rm has private information about its
e¢ ciency and net operating prots in the two countries, and about the value of the outside
investment option. It has an incentive to report a low productivity in the home region,
and at the same time overstating its productivity on outside investments (exaggerating
the value of its outside option). However, the productivity in the home region and the
foreign region are likely to be correlated. Thus, the MNE faces countervailing incentives:
it cannot at the same time claim to be e¢ cient and ine¢ cient.
A higher value of the outside option is benecial for the rm, and detrimental to
the governments if they cooperate. However, if the countries compete they may well
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be positively a¤ected by higher outside options. Enhanced outside options for the most
e¤cient types of rms, e.g. due to reduced entry barriers in other regions for such rms,
may actually benet the home governments and represent a Pareto improvement for those
countries and the rm. In such situations a development towards improved outside options
for rms will reduce the incentives for governments to cooperate.
We have assumed that the rm has private information about its operating prots
and about its e¢ ciency level, whereas the investment levels are assumed to be subject to
symmetric information. Observability of investments may be a reasonable description for
physical capital, but not to the same extent for intangible assets. The latter may be im-
portant for MNEs, since they typically have high levels of R&D relative to sales.31 Also,
we assume that the MNEs e¢ ciency levels are perfectly correlated in the countries of
operation. Uncorrelated e¢ ciency parameters, however, may be relevant if rms invest in
di¤erent countries in order to diversify portfolios. Asymmetric information about invest-
ment levels, or uncorrelated information parameters, may represent interesting extensions
of the present model. Each of these extensions would imply a multidimensional screening
problem, which is typically hard to solve even in a single-principal setting; see e.g. Rochet
and Chone (1998). But Rochet and Stole (2002) analyse a tractable model where the agent
(a buyer) has private information about his type (his marginal willingness to pay) as well
as his outside option, and these variables are not correlated. There is then no countervail-
ing incentives, and monopoly pricing is shown to yield no distortion at the top as well as
either no distortion at the bottom or bunching. For duoplolists the outcome is shown to
be generally qualitatively similar to the outcome under monopoly, except that under some
conditions the outcome entails e¢ cient quality allocations. Exploring the implications of
this type of model for tax competition seems highly worthwhile.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2:
31Privately observed investments that are undertaken after the tax system is in place (moral hazard)
can be accomodated in the model by interpreting the prot function as an indirect function where such
investments are chosen optimally, conditional on the observable Kjs. Privately observed investments in
place ex ante would, however, be a part of the rms (multidimensional) private information. The model
can be interpreted as representing a case where the aggregate e¤ect of sveral such variables on prots can
be captured by a one-dimensional parameter.
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Suppose principal i o¤ers the tax schedule Ri(Ki). Dene
K^i(Kj ; ) = argmax
Ki
[(Kj ;Ki; ) Ri(Ki)] (10)
By incentive compatibility the agents maximal prot must satisfy 0 () = @@ (Kj(); K^i(Kj(); ); ).
Principal js payo¤ is
EWj =
Z 

n
(1 + )

(Kj(); K^i(Kj(); ); ) Ri(K^i(Kj(); ))

 (1 +   j) ()g dF ()
By assumption Kj() maximizes this objective subject to the IC constraint and IR-
constraints for the two end-types. Letting j =
1+ j
1+ , the Hamiltionian for the problem
is
H(Kj ; ; ; p) =
n
(Kj ; K^i(Kj ; ); ) Ri(K^i(Kj ; ))  j
o
f()
+p
@
@
(Kj ; K^i(Kj ; ); ) (11)
The necessary conditions for an optimum include (Seierstad-Sydsaeter 1987, Thm 5 p 185)
p0() =  @H@ = jf(), p()  0, p()  0. These conditions imply p() = j(F ()   c),
0  c  1. So we may write
p() = j(F ()  F (j)), some j 2 [; ]
It is further necessary that Kj() maximizes the Hamiltonian. The rst-order condition
for that is (using the envelope property for K^i)
j(Kj ; K^i(Kj ; ); ) +
p()
f()
"
j(Kj ; K^i(Kj ; ); ) + i(Kj ; K^i(Kj ; ); )
@K^i
@Kj
#
= 0
In equilibrium we must have K^i(Kj(); ) = Ki(). From the denition of K^i we can then
derive an (equilibrium) expression for @K^i@Kj (see the text following the lemma). Substitut-
ing this expression and the expression for p() into the rst-order condition above yields
the formula (8). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
It is well known that for the conventional case with type independent reservation utility
(so 1 = 2 = ) and contract substitutes (12 < 0) the system (8) has a unique solution
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that satises the necessary conditions (7) for common implementability (Stole 1992, Mar-
timort 1992). These necessary conditions for implementability are also su¢ cient in the
case of quadratic functions and contract substitutes, provided both schedules K1();K2()
are nondecreasing. The same reasoning shows that for given 1; 2 2 [; ] the system (8)
has a unique commonly implementable solution. For  uniform (so F () F (
j)
f() is linear)
this solution has moreover schedules K1();K2() that are linear in . From (8) we see
(by symmetry) that the (constant) slopes are equal; K 01 = K 02 = K 0. Moreover, we have
(by symmetry and common implementability (7)) 0  2 121 K 0  1. (In fact it can be
veried by explicit solution of (8) that both inequalities are strict when  is strictly con-
cave). Standard arguments then show that if R1(K1); R2(K2) is a pair of tax schedules
that implement the solution K1();K2(), then these schedules are mutual best responses,
and hence an equilibrium of the taxation game.
Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium equations (8) now take the form:
m + k   (q + a)Kj()  aKi() = 1 +   j
1 + 
"
m+
maK 0i()
aK 0j() m
#
(j   ); (12)
where i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j. The system has linear solutions of the form Kj() = Lj +
K 0j; j = 1; 2: Equations (12) yield four equations for the six parameters that characterize
the solutions, i.e., (Lj ;K 0j ; j); j = 1; 2:
m  (q + a)K 0j   aK 0i =  
1 +   j
1 + 
"
m+
maK 0i
aK 0j  m
#
; (13)
k   (q + a)Lj   aLi = 1 +   j
1 + 
"
m+
maK 0i
aK 0j  m
#
j ; (14)
The necessary implementability conditions (7) can be written, given K 0j > 0 as
0  a
m
K 0j  1 j = 1; 2 and
a
m
K 01 +
a
m
K 02  1: (15)
The slopes of the equilibrium schedules are seen to be independent of 1; 2, and therefore
the same as in the case of no outside option. For symmetric countries (where 1 = 2) they
are also symmetric, so K 01 = K 02 = K 0. An equilibrium as described in Proposition 3 must
in addition satisfy () = n() and () = n(), hence we must have n() n() = R  @@ d,
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i.e.,
n()  n() =
Z 

2X
j=1
m(Lj +K
0 + h)d = m

(L1 + L2) + 2h+K
0 : (16)
While the slopes K 0j of the equilibrium schedules are uniquely determined (and equal) un-
der the conditions given in the last proposition, we note that there are only three equations
to determine the remaining four parameters that characterize the equilibrium investment
schedules. Consider now an equilibrium solution (Lj ;K 0; j); j = 1; 2. According to (16),
the solution must satisfy L1 + L2 = M , where M is a uniquely determined constant. We
can then construct a new solution by letting the new intercepts satisfy this relation, and
solve for the new j-parameters from (12). (This is feasible, at least for small variations
in the intercept parameters.) This proves the rst part of the proposition.
To verify part (ii), note that we have jKj() = j (Lj +K 0) and that 0() = @@ =
jm (Lj +K
0 + h). Since the last sum is uniquely determined and () is given, we see
that () is uniquely determined for all , as was to be shown.
To verify part (iii) note that total welfare is W1 +W2 = (1 + )(K1;K2; )   (1 +
   j)(). Rents () are constant across the relevant equilibria. In these equilibria
investments are of the form K1() = K() + , K2() = K()   . By symmetry and
concavity of the objective (K1;K2; ) it is maximal for  = 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. (Sketch)
In the fully symmetric case one can easily solve for and compare the slope para-
meters (K 0jC , K
0
j) of the investment schedules for the cooperative and the competitive
regime, respectively. One nds that (as in Olsen and Osmundsen 2001) K 0jC 7 K 0j i¤
1+
1+2
7 	 1 = q4a + 1. Consider the case
1+
1+2
< 	 1. The investment schedule is then
steeper in the competitive regime (K 0jC < K
0
j). By considering the various possibilities
for binding IR constraints, the results in the proposition then follow. The complementary
case is handled similarly.
Proof of Proposition 6
Since the countries are symmetric with respect to technologies and owner shares, equa-
tions (13) admit unique solutions K 0j , with K
0
1 = K
0
2. For every  in (1; 2), and every
outside value function in the family N(), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium of the
form given in Proposition 4, with parameters L1 = L2 and 1 = 2 2 (; ). From (14,16)
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we see that these parameters are in fact linear functions of ; with Lj() strictly increasing
and j() strictly decreasing. The total value E(W1+W2) associated with this equilibrium
can (after an integration by parts) be written as
(1 + )
Z 


(K1;K2; )  (1  1 + 2
1 + 
)
@
@
(K1;K2; )
F (1)  F ()
f()

dF ()
 (1 +   1   2)

()F (1) + ()[1  F (1)]
	
;
where Kj = Kj(; ) = Lj() + K 0j, 1 = 1(), () = 0 (by our normalization) and
() = . Note that the partial derivative of this expression wrt. 1 is zero. Using the
uniform distribution, the marginal e¤ect on total expected welfare ( @@E(W1 +W2)) can
then be written as (1 + ) times the following expressionZ 

X
j

@
@Kj
  (1  1 + 2
1 + 
)
@2
@Kj@
(1   )

@Kj
@
d   (1  1 + 2
1 + 
)[1  1]:
Using (8,12) and symmetry we can write this as
2(1  1
1 + 
)[m+
maK 01
aK 01  m
]  (1  21
1 + 
)2m
 Z 

(1   )d@K1
@
  (1  21
1 + 
)[1  1]
(17)
Note that  = 1 yields 1 =  = 1, and hence
@
@
E(W1 +W2)=1 = (1 + )

(1  1
1 + 
)[1 +
aK 01
aK 01  m
]  (1  21
1 + 
)

C (18)
where C = 2m
R 1
0 (1   )d @K1@ . From (16) we see that @K1@ = @L1@ = 12m , so C = 12 .
Di¤erentiating once more in (17) we obtain
@2
@2
E(W1 +W2)
(1 + )
=

(1  1
1 + 
)[1 +
aK 01
aK 01  m
]  (1  21
1 + 
)

+ (1  21
1 + 
)

@1
@
< 0
where the inequality follows from (15) and @
1
@ < 0. Hence the total value E(W1 +W2) is
strictly concave in , and therefore increasing for some  if and only if @@E(W1+W2) > 0
for  = 1.
The equation (13) can be solved explicitly forK 01 in this case. Doing so and substituting
into (18) we nd
@
@
E(W1 +W2)=1 = (1 + )
h
1 +Q=2 
p
 + 2 +Q2=4  
i
C; (19)
where Q = qa + 1 > 1 and  = 1   11+ . The condition @@E(W1 + W2)=1 > 0 then
holds i¤ 1 +Q > (Q+ 3). Substituting for  and Q, the latter condition is equivalent to
1
1+ >
2
4+q=a . This is again equivalent to the condition stated in the proposition.
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Finally note that for  = 2 we have (by denition of 2) j =  = 0, and hence
@
@

E(W1 +W2)
(1 + )

=2
= [(1  1
1 + 
)[1+
aK 01
aK 01  m
]  (1  21
1 + 
)]( 1
2
)  (1  21
1 + 
) < 0
This proves the rst part of the proposition.
Finally consider the marginal welfare e¤ect in (19). Di¤erentiation shows that the
expression in (19) is decreasing in  and increasing in Q. Since Q = qa + 1 is inversely
related to the (point) elasticity of substitution  = 2aq + 1, it follows that the marginal
welfare e¤ect in (19) is decreasing in  and in . This completes the proof.
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